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NOTES
ALL BETTS ARE OFF: HOW EMPLOYERS
SHOULD VIEW THE OLDER WORKERS' BENEFIT
PROTECTION ACT
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter "ADEA"
or "Act")' prohibits arbitrary discrimination by public and private employers
against older employees. However, the ADEA's drafters recognized that employers
should not be completely prohibited from distinguishing among their employees
based upon age.2 More specifically, they believed that the Act should include an
exception which would allow employers to vary the levels of benefits paid to
older workers.3
To address this specific issue, Congress added §4(f)(2) to the Act.4 Legislators
maintained that without such an exemption, the Act would discourage employers
from hiring older workers due to excessive benefit costs.' As a result, employers
were relieved of the duty to provide older workers with equal benefits if they
took such action pursuant to the terms of any "bona fide employee benefit plan
... which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of (the ADEA)."' 6
Prior to 1989, some courts which had interpreted this provision found that
the exemption should be limited to those situations where there was a specific
business purpose or cost justification reason for the disparate treatment.' Other
courts analyzing §4(0(2) believed that the burden was on employers to invoke
1. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), as amended 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. (West 1985
and Supp. 1990).
2. See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1967) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings].
3. In the House, Representative Hawkins sponsored H.R. 13054 as a means of addressing this
issue. Senator Javits, introduced S. 788 because the Johnson Administration's bill, S. 830, failed "to
provide any flexibility in the amount of pension benefits payable to older workers depending on their
age when hired." Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 24.
4. 81 Stat. 602, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1985)).
5. Senator Javits believed "the increased costs involved in providing certain types of benefits"
to older workers would prejudice employers against older workers. S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1967).
6. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1985 and Supp. 1987) provides in relevant part:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer ... (2) to observe the terms of... any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [this chapter], except that no such employee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual... or permit the involuntary
retirement of any individual ... because of the age of such individual.
See also Charles B. Craver, The Application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to
Persons over Seventy, 58 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv. 52, 96 n. 188 (1989).
7. EEOC v. City of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480, 1492 (3d Cir. 1988); Betts v. Hamilton
County Board of Mental Retardation, 848 F.2d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Public
Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); Karlen v. City Colleges of
Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.) cert. denied sub. nom. Cook County College Teachers Union
Local 1600, etc. v. City Colleges of Chicago, Bd. of Trustees, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988); EEOC v.
Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
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the exemption as an affirmative defense rather than on employees to plead it as
an element of their case.'
However, the Supreme Court, in Public Employees Retirement System of
Ohio v. Betts,9 redefined an employer's liability for age discrimination with
respect to employee benefit plans. The Court rejected the argument that age-
based distinctions in such plans were exempt from coverage only when justified
by increased costs or other economic considerations.' 0 The Court also struck "a
further blow against the statutory rights of older workers,"" by characterizing
§4(0(2) as a description of the type of employee conduct prohibited in the
employee benefit context, and not as an affirmative defense employers must
raise.' 2 In taking this approach, the Court discarded the ADEA's legislative
history, rejected the position of the Department of Justice and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and overturned more than twenty years of
executive branch regulations and judicial precedent.' 3
Congress and the President responded by recently passing the Older Workers'
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) 4 to strengthen the ADEA. This addendum
clarifies that age discrimination in virtually all forms of employee benefits is
unlawful." In addition, the OWBPA ensures that older employees will not be
forced or manipulated into giving up their rights to seek relief under the ADEA.16
This note will attempt to analyze these amendments and assess their impact
on employers. Part I will examine the history and scope of §4(0(2). Part II will
discuss the Betts case and the reasoning behind it. Part III will focus on the
OWBPA in detail and will delineate the various changes these amendments bring
to the ADEA. Part IV will investigate what areas employers should concentrate
on in attempting to comply with the OWBPA. Finally, the note will conclude
by suggesting further changes or modifications that must occur within the
OWBPA in order for it to achieve its goal of balancing needed protection for
older workers with the employers' freedom to design and administer benefit
plans.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
When the Johnson Administration proposed an age discrimination bill in
1967,17 they failed to include a provision preventing age distinctions in employee
benefit plans. Congress immediately realized that such an omission would cause
8. Trans World Airlines, Inc v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Cipriano v. Board of Educ. of
N. Tonawanda, 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986).
9. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
10. Id. at 175.
11. Id. at 186 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 181. See also Catherine R. Urban, Note, Section 4(0(2) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: No Justification? Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 24 IND. L. REv.
161, 165 (1991).
13. S. Rep. No. 260, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
Naws at 1519 (hereinafter Senate Report).
14. Pub L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat 978 as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 2287
(1990).
15. See infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 107-124 and accompanying text.
17. Senate Report at 1511. See also Bruce E. Reinhart, Note, Interpreting Section 4(f)(2) of the
ADEA: Does Anyone Have A Plan?, 135 U.PA. L. REv. 1055 (1987).
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employers to avoid employing older people. s It correctly assumed that employers
would oppose having to offer older workers the same benefits offered to its
younger employees due to cost considerations. 9 As a result, both the Senate and
House proposed amendments to their bills which would give employers flexibility
in designing their particular benefit plans. 20 This addition, eventually known as
§4(0(2), provided specific situations where an employer could offer distinct benefit
plans to its different employees and was included in the final version of the
ADEA.
2 1
Responsibility for enforcing this new law fell to the Department of Labor
(DOL).? As part of this duty, the DOL attempted to interpret §4(0(2). The
DOL's findings resulted in what has come to be known as the "equal benefit or
equal cost" principle. 23 Under this concept, an age-based distinction is allowed
for employee benefits provided it is justified by age-related cost increases for
benefits. 2'
In the ensuing years a conflict arose among courts about whether an employee
benefit plan that pre-dated the ADEA and which caused involuntary retirement
was authorized under §4(f)(2).7 The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the
issue in United Air Lines v. McMann6 by holding that an employee benefit plan
which preceded the ADEA could not constitute a subterfuge to evade the statute
or its purposes. 27
Congress reacted swiftly to the McMann holding by reemphasizing the "equal
benefit or equal cost" interpretation of §4(0(2). This interpretation was codified
in part in the 1978 amendments to the ADEA.28 These new amendments rejected
the Court's ruling in McMann by stating that no employee benefit plan shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual because of the
individual's age. 29 However, Congress neglected to revise or repeal the term
18. Senate Hearings at 6 (prepared statement of Senator Javits).
19. Id. at 24 (prepared statement of Senator Javits).
20. 113 CoNo. Rc. 34,439, 34,754 (1967).
21. The proposed amendment to §4(0(2) was described by Senator Javits as a "fairly broad
exemption for bona fide retirement and seniority systems." 113 CONG. Rc. 34,746 (1967); the bill
which finally became law was the Senate bill, modified somewhat by the language of the House bill.
1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhMN NEws at 2213.
22. Senate Report at 1512. See also Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 6-7, 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1967)(original
Act gave responsibility of administration to Secretary of Labor).
23. See 29 C.F.R., Section 860.120(a)(1970).
24. Id. See also Senate Report at 1513.
25. Compare, Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting, Co. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974)(mandatory
retirement pursuant to an employee benefit plan that pre-dated the ADEA was lawful); with, McMann
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976)(under §4(f)(2), a forced, age-based retirement
pursuant to a pre-ADEA plan would be considered a "subterfuge" to evade the ADEA absent an
employer's showing of a legitimate business purpose for such an action)
26. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
27. Id. at 196.
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-556, §2(a),
92 Stat. 189 (1978) codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §523(0(2) (1982) (hereinafter 1978 Amendments).
See Judith A. McMorrow, Retirement and Worker Choice: Incentives to Retire and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 B.C.L. Rav. 347 (1988); Thomas W. Millet, Note, Federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Pension Plan Exception After McMann and the 1978
Amendments, 54 Nom DAME L. Rv. 323 (1978).
29. See 1978 Amendments. The House Conference Report accompanying these amendments made
clear that the purpose of §4(0(2) was to "make absolutely clear one of the original purposes of this
1991 ]
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"subterfuge" or any part of the surrounding language of §4(f)(2), and thus the
term's meaning remained unclear? °
Another attempt at clarifying §4(f)(2) occurred a year later when the DOL
added a provision to its interpretative regulations on employee benefits.,' This
addition reiterated the earlier concepts of cost justification. It also specified that
the only cost relevant to the issue of subterfuge was the cost of the particular
challenged benefit.32
When enforcement authority for the ADEA was transferred from DOL to
the EEOC in July of 1979, these interpretative regulations were unaffected.33 In
fact, prior to Betts, many courts addressing issues under §4(f)(2) relied extensively
on the regulations as a basis for their holdings.3 4 However, other courts expressly
repudiated the position taken under the 1979 regulations. This conflict forced
the Supreme Court to address this issue in Public Employee Retirement System
of Ohio v. Betts. 36
II. THE CONTROVERSY IS SPARKED
In 1933, Ohio established the Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio
(PERS), which provides state and local employees with retirement benefits in one
of two forms.37 First, PERS offers retirement benefits based upon age and service.
Additionally, it extends disability benefits to employees who are under the age
of sixty and who have at least five years of service. 38
In 1976, amendments to the PERS statutory scheme mandated that disability
payments constitute at least thirty percent of the employee's final salary.
39
However, the amendments failed to include a corresponding minimum payment
in the case of age and service benefits.4 This distinction was at the heart of the
controversy in Betts.
provision, namely, that the exception does not authorize an employer to require or permit involuntary
retirement of an employee within the protected age group on account of age." H.R. CONF REP No.
950, 95th Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 528, 529. See also
Stephen S. Rappoport, Age Discrimination A Legal and Practical Guide for Employers, (1989).
30. See Daniel O'Meara, Protecting the Growing Number of Older Workers, (1989).
31. The amendment provided in part:
[wihere employee benefit plans do meet the criteria in Section 4(f)(2), benefit levels for
older workers may be reduced to the extent necessary to achieve approximate equivalency
in cost for older and younger workers. A benefit plan will be considered in compliance
with the statute where the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in behalf
of an older worker, is equal to that made or incurred in behalf of a younger worker,
even though the older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of benefits or
insurance coverage. Since section 4(0(2) is an exception from the general non-discrim-
ination provisions of the Act, the burden is on the one seeking to invoke the exception
to show that every element has been clearly and unmistakably met.
29 C.F.R. §860.120 (1979).
32. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(d)(1) (1979).
33. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. Section 321, reprinted in, 92 Stat. 3781 (1978). See
also 44 Fed. Reg. 37974 (1979).
34. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
35. Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982);
Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974); Germann v. Levy, 553 F.Supp. 700
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
36. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
37. Id. at 162.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 163.
40. Id.
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The case concerned a woman named June M. Betts who had been employed
since 1978 by a county agency covered by PERS. 41 In 1985, upon reaching the
age of 61, Betts had to retire from the agency as a result of health problems. 42
Despite her medical condition, Betts' age precluded her from receiving disability
payments under PERS. 43 Moreover, the age and service benefits to which she
was entitled amounted to less than one half of the minimum disability payments
she would have received, because there was no thirty percent floor with respect
to age and service benefits."4
Consequently, Betts filed a charge against PERS with the EEOC.4 5 She also
brought suit in federal court maintaining that PERS violated the ADEA by
refusing to grant her application for disability benefits.4 The district court granted
summary judgment for Betts, concluding that the PERS plan was not entitled to
protection under §4(f)(2), and a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
decision.4 7 However, the Supreme Court shocked the*employment world by
reversing these holdings in a carefully drafted opinion. 4 s
First, the Court reasoned that a benefit plan adopted prior to the enactment
of the ADEA could not constitute a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the
Act.4 9 It reached this result by finding that although the 1978 amendments to the
ADEA altered the outcome in McMann, the amendments' language failed to
have an impact on the term "subterfuge." 50 Accordingly, the court found that
the term should be given its ordinary meaning, and that employee benefit plans
adopted prior to the ADEA's enactment could not be a subterfuge . 5
Second, the Court applied its definition of subterfuge and determined that
a plan which denied benefits on the basis of age would only constitute a subterfuge
when employers intended the plan to discriminate in some non-fringe benefit
aspect of the employment relationship.5 1
Third, and most importantly, the Court held that the general prohibition on
discrimination under the ADEA did not apply to employee benefit plans. 3 This
view of §4(a)(1) sharply contrasted with that of those courts who had previously
addressed this issue.5 4 In the past these courts tended to find a per se violation
of that provision if age caused an employee's benefits to be reduced or elimi-
nated.5
Finally, the Court shifted the burden of proof in §4(0(2) cases. The Court







47. Id. See also 848 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988).
48. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
49. Betts, 492 U.S. at 168.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 177. The Court interpreted the ADEA's legislative history to support this proposition.
See also Rappoport, supra note 29, at 352.
53. Betts, 492 at 177. The Court concluded that "Congress left the employee benefit battle for
another day, and legislated only as to hiring and firing, wages and salaries, and other nonfringe-
benefit terms and conditions of employment." Id.
54. See supra notes 7 and 8.
55. Karlen, 837 F.2d at 320; City of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d at 1494.
1991]
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implemented with an intent to discriminate when the employee brought an action
under the above portion of the statute. 56
The potential effect of Betts was quite favorable to employers. It appeared
to insulate employers from virtually any claim surrounding employee benefits.5 7
The ruling exempted any bona fide benefit plan established prior to the ADEA
from scrutiny under the Act.5 1 With regard to post-ADEA benefit plans, Betts
allowed an employer to implement age-based distinctions in benefit plans which
were not justified by differences in plan costs.5 9 As long as an employer made
sure the benefit plan did not violate the express provisions of the Act, employees
were prevented from utilizing the ADEA to attack the plan. 60
Additionally, with the burden of proof placed on the employee to demonstrate
that their particular plan's features adversely affected some non-fringe benefit
aspect of the employment relationship, employers could be confident of prevailing
on this issue in the future.6 1 Employees would find it considerably difficult to
overcome the "severe evidentiary and practical obstacles" needed to prove
discrimination with unlawful motives. 62
Consequently, Congress attempted to equalize the positions of both sides
through the passage of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act.
III. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
Congress' reaction to the stunning decision in Betts was swift. Both the
Senate and House wasted little time in drafting legislation designed to refute the
position enunciated by the Supreme Court. 63 Underlying these various proposals
56. Betts, 492 U.S. at 181. Applying its reasoning to the case, the Court noted Betts had not
met the burden of showing that PERS intentionally discriminated in a non-fringe benefit aspect of
employment. Thus, the Court believed summary judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case
to give Betts a chance to show a genuine issue of material fact existed. Id. at 181-82.
57. See Rappoport, supra note 29, at 358.
58. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. See also Robert Mirabella, Comment, Age
Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans and the Scope of the Section 4(f)(2) Exemption: Public
Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 32 B.C.L. REV. 273 (1990);
As one individual testifying on behalf of S. 1511 stated, "Betts has the potential to
permit employers who have been discriminating the longest - those with benefit plans
that pre-date the ADEA - to continue to discriminate with absolute immunity. The
worst offenders are [thus] permitted to continue to discriminate.
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, S. Hearing 101-308, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 184 (1989).
59. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also Robinson v. County of Fresno, 882 F.2d
444 (9th Cir. 1989) (county that adopted a new formula for computing service and disability retirement
benefits after the ADEA was made applicable to it did not violate the Act, because there was no
showing that the formula change demonstrated the county's intent to discriminate in some non-fringe
benefit aspect of the employment relationship); cf. Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp. 896 F.2d 463 (10th
Cir.) cert den 11 S.Ct. 252 (1990).
60. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 729 F.Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); See also Stephen N. Shulman
& Charles F. Abernathy, The Law of Equal Employment Opportunity (1990).
61. See supra note 53. EEOC v. Bethlehem Steel, 727 F.Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Gabarczyk
v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Poughkeepsie, 738 F.Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Joseph
E. Kalet, Age Discrimination in Employment Law (2d ed. 1990).
62. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 186 n.5. (Marshall, J., dissenting); See Craver, supra note 6, at 97-98.
See also Neil H. Abramson, Early Retirement Incentives under the ADEA, I1I NDus. REL. L.J. 323
(1989).
63. See S. 1293, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1511, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R.
3200, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Eventually the Senate focused on S. 1511 and persuaded the
House to consider this version in lieu of H.R. 3200. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
All Betts Are Off
was the desire to reaffirm the supposed original meaning of §4 of the ADEA. 64
Supporters of the provisions included the EEOC, senior citizen organizations
and certain civil rights groups.65 They claimed the legislation was necessary to
prevent what they thought would be unfair treatment of older workers. 66 Oppo-
nents to the proposed amendments enjoyed the backing of other organizations
and businesses. 67 They responded by arguing that the legislation would hurt those
it was designed to protect because of its harsh repercussions. 6
However, aversion to the proposals, was not limited to lobbyists. 69 In the
Senate, those against S. 1511 voiced concern that measures which prohibited an
employer from replacing long-term disability benefits and severance pay without
the worker's approval would adversely affect voluntary early retirement pro-




Resistance was also apparent with regard to the original language in S. 1511
requiring that early retirement plans clearly satisfy all three specifically stated
purposes of the ADEA. 72 The sentiment was that this standard would be too
onerous for employers.
Additionally, those opposed to the new measures fought against language
which would have allowed employers to "integrate" or offset disability and
severance payments with accrued pension benefits only when an employee vol-
untarily retired. 73 It was thought that if that language remained, the amendments
would have severely curtailed an employer's flexibility in this area.
Finally, the proponent's attempts to make the bill retroactive to the date of
Betts was contested on the grounds that it would be unfair to ask employers to
have foreseen the passage of this bill. 74
64. See 135 CONG. REC. S9949(daily ed. Aug 3, 1989)(statement of Sen. Pryor):
[this bill] would amend section 4(f)(2) by deleting the term "subterfuge" and codifying
[the] EEOC's long-accepted equal benefit or equal cost test .... The bill would also
assure that pre-1967 employee benefit plans are subject to the provisions of the ADEA,
and assure that the 4(f)(2) exclusion is an affirmative defense under the ADEA, and
the employer has the burden of proving that defense.
Id.
65. These included the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the National Senior
Citizens Law Center and UNUM Life Insurance Company. See Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act, S. Hearing 101-308, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (hereinafter OWBPA Hearings).
66. At the OWBPA hearings on this matter, Horace Deets, Executive Director of the AARP,
thanked Congress for the "opportunity to express [the] AARP's strong support for legislation that
would restore the rights of older workers to fair treatment in employee benefits." Id. at 168.
67. Among those who voiced concern were the Association of Private Pension and Welfare
Plans, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers
and the ERISA Industry Committee.
68. Mark S. Dichter represented the aforementioned organizations at the hearing and testified
that "[tihe [bill] would also result in the elimination of many early retirement programs. Thus, the
older workers that we all want to protect would be best served by the defeat of S. 1511/ S. 1293."
OWBPA Hearings at 265.
69. Senate Report at 1550-1551.
70. Id. at 1559-1560.
71. Id.
72. See 136 CONG. REC. S13,599 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch). See also
infra note 130.
73. Senate Report at 1559.
74. Id. at 1562.
19911
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Following compromise on each of these issues, the Senate eventually adopted
an amended version of S. 151 1.7 The result, known as the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act, still remained particularly weighted against employers. In fact,
many who agreed to the compromise continued to have concerns about the long-
term effect of the proposal.7 6 However, the bill progressed through the House
and was eventually signed into law by President Bush. 71
The OWBPA basically consists of two sections. Title I reverses the holding
in Betts through a number of intricate changes and additions to §4 of the
ADEA. 7 1 Title I's main purpose is to codify the cost justification requirement on
employers set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and accompanying
documents. Title II addresses the issue of waivers and releases of age discrimi-
nation claims. 79 This part imposes a series of tests which employers must satisfy
before a court may consider whether a "knowing and voluntary" waiver has
occurred.80
A. Employee Benefits
Title I begins by reasserting Congress' opposition to discrimination against
older workers in the employee benefit area." It states that Betts made these
changes necessary."2 In order to rectify the apparent effect of Betts, this section
makes six major alterations to the current language of the ADEA.
The amendments clarify that the ADEA's prohibition against age discrimi-
nation in "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment" covers
75. See 136 CONG. REC. S13,613 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990).
76. Id. at S13,599 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I would not be surprised if we are back on the
floor of the Senate in 2 or 3 years time debating amendments to this very bill"); Senator Grassly
also voiced his uneasiness about the proposal when he stated,
I am not sure we have seen the last of this legislation. As I noted earlier, employee
benefit law is extremely complicated. Furthermore, we have not considered this legislation
under the best of circumstances, by which I mean that we really have not had much
time to consider [the final] version of the bill.
Id. at S13,608.
77. Passed in House on October 3, 1990. 136 CONG. REC. H8738 (daily ed. October 3, 1990);
The President signed it into law on October 16, 1990.
78. See infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 107-124 and accompanying text.
80. Prior to the Act, the test to determine the validity of the release of ADEA claims was
grounded in the analysis that has been applied to claims arising under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e
et seq. Specifically, it was that an employee could validly waive claims of discrimination so long as
the waiver was made "knowingly and willfully." See Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856
F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Other courts have applied the "totality of the circumstances" approach, or aspects of it, described
in Coventry to evaluate the release form itself and the circumstances under which it was executed.
Among the factors they considered were (1) the clarity and specificity of the release language; (2)
the plaintiff's education and business experience; (3) the amount of time plaintiff had for deliberation
about the release before signing it; (4) whether plaintiff knew or should have known his rights upon
execution of the release; (5) whether plaintiff was encouraged to seek or in fact received benefit of
counsel; (6) whether there was an opportunity for negotiation of the terms of the Agreement; and
(7) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver and accepted by the employee exceeds
the benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law. See Cirillo v. Arco
Chemical Co., 862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988); See also, Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809
F.2d 539 (8th Cir.) cert den. 482 U.S. 928 (1987); Rogers v. General Electric Co., 781 F.2d 452 (5th
Cir. 1986); Pilon v. University of Minnesota, 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1983).
81. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub L. No. 101-433, §101, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
82. Id.
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all employee benefits, including those given through a bona fide employee benefit
plan. 3 This wording expressly refutes the Court's finding in Betts that ADEA
§4(a)(1) did not apply to employee benefits. The Senate Report added that
Congress placed this language here, instead of with §4(a)(1), for a very specific
reason.8' It wanted to reestablish that the ADEA prohibitions on discrimination
must be interpreted in a way similar to the language prohibiting discrimination
in employee benefits under Title VII. s5 Congress also clarified that, while every
benefit would now be subject to §4(a)(1) concerns, the amendment would not
affect any limitations courts had imposed on the types of benefit plans that are
protected by §4(f)(2).8
Title I next addresses the controversial term "subterfuge" and removes it
from the language of §4(f)(2).8 By codifying the "equal benefit, equal cost"
principle, Congress has affirmed the policy that age discrimination with respect
to employee benefits will only be tolerated when similar benefits will result in
unequal costs for the employer."s
There are two different types of cost comparisons which an employer may
utilize to satisfy this standard. If the employer chooses to invoke what is known
as a "benefit by benefit" cost comparison analysis, the employer is required to
compare benefit costs for employees who differ in age. Under this approach, the
employer will make any adjustments in the benefit amount or level on an
individual benefit basis. Alternatively, the employer can make the necessary
calculations using a "benefit package cost comparison," so that cost comparisons
and adjustments are made for covered plans in the aggregate. This method is
well suited for "cafeteria style" benefit programs in which an employer designates
a specified dollar amount that can be used by each eligible employee to purchase
what benefits the employee finds desirable. s9 Note, however, that an employer is
not allowed to invoke this method under certain circumstances. 90
There are notable exceptions to the "equal benefit equal cost" requirement.
The amendment specifically allows for discrepancy among early retirement plans
so long as the action taken is consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes
of the Act."
83. Id. at §103.
84. Senate Report at 1522.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1523.
87. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §103(1), 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
88. Id. at §103(2)(BXi). The cost consideration need not be actuarially based, but employers
must use reasonable data to justify lower benefits. Employers must also indicate the actual cost
which would be incurred if the benefit were provided over a certain number of years. See Thomas
J. Wiencek, How the Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act affects employers, 37 PRc. LAw. 69,
71 (1991). See also infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
89. Wiencek, supra note 88, at 71.
90. The benefit package approach is not permitted (1) for benefit plans that do not fall within
an employee benefit plan exception; (2) for retirement or pension plans; (3) to justify reductions in
health insurance benefits greater than would be justified under a benefit by benefit system; or (4) to
justify any benefit reduction greater than one that would be claimed under the benefit by benefit
approach unless the employer offsets this reduction by offering the employees another benefit. See
Wiencek, supra note 88, at 72.
91. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(2)(B)(ii), 104 Stat. 979
(1990). The sponsors of this proposal emphasized that the ADEA has employed such a standard for
over 20 years. The common approach has been to consider only the purpose or purposes that are
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Additionally, the new language carves out an exception for the two most
widely used types of early retirement incentives: pension benefits and social
security "bridge" payments.Y Employees participating in these type of incentive
programs can sue for age discrimination only if they demonstrate that their
participation was involuntary.93 They may not rely on the theory that such a
plan was not consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of the Act.
However, employers who establish minimum ages as a condition of eligibility for
early or normal retirement benefits must also abide by certain requirements.9
Title I further emphasizes that employers choosing to utilize this section
must recognize it as an affirmative defense.9 Contrary to the Court's interpre-
tation in Betts, this section clarifies that it is an employer's duty to prove the
action taken was lawful." Once an employee presents a prima facie case that an
employer violated the statute, the burden shifts to the employer. This burden
must be distinguished from the instance where the question arises about the
voluntariness of an employee's retirement. In the latter case, Title I reaffirms
that the employee, and not the employer, shoulders the responsibility of proving
that an early retirement incentive was received involuntarily.Y
The issue of integration or offsetting disability and severance payments with
accrued pension benefits is settled through Title I as well.98 The amendments
provide that only when an employee decides to begin receiving a pension or
reaches normal retirement age, can an employer integrate long term disability
payments with pension benefits." Severance reductions are now only permitted
in proportion to the retiree health benefits an employer offers.1 ° Employers
should also note that in the case of a plant shutdown, the added benefits or
"sweeteners" extended to older workers can now be offset against normal
severance pay.10
relevant to the issue at hand. The Report notes that the purpose implicated in considering an early
retirement incentive plan or any particular feature of that plan is the purpose of prohibiting arbitrary
age discrimination in employment. 136 CONG. REc. S13,596 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990).
92. Id. at §§ 4()(l)(A), 4(1)(2)(A). A social security "bridge" payment is usually a fixed monthly
payment intended to substitute for social security benefits that will become available to the person
participating in the plan either at age 62 (when they are eligible for reduced Social Security benefits)
or age 65 (when they are eligible for unreduced Social Security benefits). Senate Report at 1526.
93. Senate Report at 1526. See also 136 CoNG. Rac. S13,600 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Hatch).
94. An employer must show that this type of plan feature is a permanent part of a pension
plan, that it is subject to modification in a prospective basis by amendment of the plan, and that
this modification is consistent with any other applicable law. This permanent plan feature must be
continually available to participants in the plan who satisfy the eligibility requirements, regardless of
whether any unforeseen event occurs. Wiencek, supra note 88, at 74.
95. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §4(f)(2)(A), 104 Stat. 979
(1990). See also 136 CoNG. REc. S13,596 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (prepared statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum).
96. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying notes in text. See also Senate Report at 1535.
97. But see infra note 128.
98. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §4()(2)(F), 104 Stat. 980(1990).
99. Id. See also 136 CONG. REc. S13,597 (daily ed., Sept. 24, 1990) (prepared statement of Sen.
Hatch).
100. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 4()(2)(A), 104 Stat. 979.(1990).
101. See 136 CONG. Rac. S13,600 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch) The original
bill restricted the integration of "sweeteners" to situations where an employer also provided a specific
package of retiree health benefits. Id.
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Responding to the inexplicable distinction drawn in Betts, Title I ensures
that the ADEA will not recognize any difference between pre- and post-ADEA
employee benefit provisions.1 02 Thus, employers must be aware that subject to
the exceptions noted above, any form of age discrimination in employee benefits
is prohibited, regardless of when the particular program originated.
The final portion of Title I gives the effective date for these modifications. 3
Those employee benefits established or modified on or after October 16, 1990,
are subject to the OWBPA immediately. 1' 4 Non-collectively bargained private
employers, who established benefit programs prior to the OWBPA, enjoyed a
180 day grace period from the date the amendments became effective. 05 As a
result, private employers falling into the above category should check that all
benefit plans have satisfied the new requirements prior to April 15, 1991.
However, employers covered by collectively-bargained plans are in an unique
position. Since they cannot unilaterally alter the affected portions of these plans
to comply with the OWBPA, the amendments offer special relief. Employers
falling within this particular group have until the earlier of the termination of
their current agreement or June 1, 1992, to align themselves with the new laws.10"
B. Waivers and Releases
Title II was enacted to address waivers and releases of age discrimination
claims.1°7 The goal was to protect older employees from being coerced or
manipulated into relinquishing any rights or claims under the Act. The amend-
ments sought to achieve this by developing a series of tests to measure whether
102. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §105(a)(2), 104 Stat. 981
(1990).
103. Id. at §105. See also supra note 74.
104. Id. at §105(a)(l).
105. Id. at §105(a)(2).
106. Id. at §105(b).
107. For a brief history and analysis of waivers and releases, see 2 HowARD C. EULIT, AoE
DIscRMNATION §§ 16.47A, 16.47B (1990). Eglit begins by noting, "[r]eleases of liability are common
in all areas of the law: in return for some type of consideration proffered by the defendant, the
plaintiff agrees to waive his or her right to pursue legal redress by releasing the claim against the
defendant." Id. at §16.47A.
S. 54, introduced by Senator Metzenbaum among others, was the predecessor to Title II. It was
drafted to resolve the turmoil which resulted from the EEOC's actions in the wake of Runyan v.
NCR, 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986). Runyan prompted the EEOC to
issue a sweeping rule permitting all employees to waive their ADEA rights in almost any circumstance
without EEOC approval.
Critics of this policy pushed for reform via S. 54, as they believed the "waiver rule" protected
employers by insulating them from liability when the employers enhanced benefit programs in an
illegal manner. The proponents to this bill contended that it would protect employees from signing
away their rights at a time when they are unable to determine if they were subject to discrimination.
Those in favor of S. 54 felt the bill would encourage employers to deal with employees in a fair
manner and to structure voluntary and involuntary severance programs in a non-discriminatory
manner. These supporters also maintained that the bill equalized the bargaining positions of the
employer and employee.
Opponents to the bill testified that while making sure employees have the proper information and
time to formulate a decision on a waiver, mandating regulations on such would only serve the purpose
of hindering the negotiation process. See Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1989).
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the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.106 Employers should recognize
that this section requires the party who asserts the waiver's validity to satisfy
each of the tests." 9 Otherwise, the release will fail to meet the knowing and
voluntary standard. This section begins by listing the various tests. The law now
mandates that the waiver be part of an agreement that can be understood by the
average person under similar circumstances.10 The waiver must also specifically
refer to rights or claims covered by the ADEA."' Employers may not entice an
employee to waive rights or claims which arise subsequent to the signing of the
waiver." 2 Only rights and claims being exchanged for consideration above that
which the employee is already entitled to are capable of being waived." 3 Employers
must encourage the employee, in writing, to seek the aid of an attorney prior to
signing the agreement." 4 Employers shall give employees at least 21 days, or in
the case of termination programs offered to a group, at least 45 days to consider
the agreement.'" Finally, the employer must incorporate a revocation provision
in the agreement allowing the employee to change his mind within seven days of
signing. 16
Title II also imposes additional obligations on employers seeking waivers in
connection with exit incentives or employment retirement programs offered to a
group or class of employees." 7 At the time the agreement is offered to the
affected employee, the employer must provide the following information: the
names of those included in the program, the factors determining eligibility and
the time period during which the program exists."' Additionally, the names and
job descriptions of those chosen for the program must accompany this infor-
mation." 9 Finally, the employer is required to publish the ages of those working
in similar jobs who were not eligible for the program.'2
Waivers and releases executed in settlement of pending EEOC charges or
actions filed in court must satisfy the first five requirements listed above.' 2' Time
requirements are relaxed in these cases, as employers only have to give a
"reasonable" amount of time for employees to consider and sign the agreement. '"
Thus, in the case of pending agency or court proceedings, the 21 day waiting
period does not apply. Employers need not provide a revocation privilege when
waivers or releases are obtained in these situations.
Consistent with present ADEA law, Title II specifies that no waiver or
release may affect the EEOC's rights and responsibilities to enforce the Act.'2 3
108. See infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
109. 136 CONG. REC. S13,597 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
110. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §7(f)(1)(A), 104 Stat. 983
(1990).
11I. Id. at §7(f)(1)(B).
112. Id. at §7(f)(1)(C).
113. Id. at §7(f)(1)(D).
114. Id. at §7Q)(1)(E).
115. Id. at §7(f)(1)(F).
116. Id. at §7(f(1)(G).




121. Id. at §7(0(2).
122. Id. at §7(f)(2)(B).
123. Id. at §7(0(3).
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It also precludes an employer from using a waiver to justify interfering with the
employee's right to participate in any EEOC action.Iu
IV. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Immediate reaction to the OWBPA among employers will probably range
from antagonism to resignation. The surprise and happiness which accompanied
the announcement of Betts will be replaced by trepidation and worry. Employers
may fear that the new amendments will hinder and interfere with how they
structure benefit packages and waivers and releases.
Although the new changes take a step towards promoting fairness in the
area of employee benefits, it is not altogether clear how courts will interpret
some of the language found in this section. This is especially true with regard to
determining whether voluntary early retirement plans are acceptable. At first
glance employers may believe that under the OWBPA the burden is on employees
to demonstrate that their retirement was involuntary.'2 The legislative history
indicates that voluntariness is determined among a series of factors which the
sponsors considered relevant,'2 a standard that differs from the original intention
of the drafters. 127 However, as one commentator notes, since the burden of proof
is on the employer to show that an early retirement incentive plan is lawful in
any civil enforcement proceeding brought under the ADEA, courts are apt to
force employers to prove the other element of lawfulness, namely that the plan
is voluntary.'2
Focusing on waivers and releases provides further reason for employers to
have concern. The ambiguous language and imprecise standards impose too great
a burden on employers and subject them to unnecessary liability.
Until the time for redrafting commences, however, employers must focus on
particular points of the enacted law. In Title I, the first relevant language
employers should focus on is found at §4(f)(2)(B)(ii).129 The current wording
allows some latitude for employers to work with when offering voluntary early
retirement programs. Generally, the relevant purpose of the Act is to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination."3 Employers seeking to satisfy this standard should
124. Id. at §7(0(4).
125. 136 CONo. Rac. S13,596 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990).
126. Among the factors the committee deemed relevant were: whether the employee had sufficient
time to consider his or her options; whether accurate and complete information has been provided
regarding the benefits available under the early retirement incentive plan; and whether there have
been threats, intimidation and/or coercion. 136 CONG. REc. S13,596 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990).
The committee further stated that the burden of proving this issue remains with the employee. Id.
127. The original bill would have forced employers to meet every purpose of the ADEA in
implementing early retirement incentive plans. Critics of the bill noted that this would have been an
impossible burden to meet. Id. See also supra note 71.
128. Niall A. Paul, The Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act: Forcing a New Look at Early
Retirement Incentives and Waivers, 17 EMPL. REL. L.J. 29, 37 (1991). While the Manager's Statement
to the OWBPA indicates that the language of the Act means that the employee retains the burden
of proof regarding the issue of involuntariness, most courts will probably adhere to an opposite
standard. The courts will probably attempt to obfuscate the various burdens and require that employers
demonstrate that the employee's participation in a plan is voluntary. Id. at 40.
129. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 1. Among the relevant purposes of the Act are to promote the employment
of older workers based on ability rather than age, to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in




find it attainable. Even employers who choose to differentiate among the plans
they offer their employees are capable of satisfying this purpose. Furthermore,
since the language is flexible, courts interpreting this subsection should employ
a liberal approach when checking that a purpose of the plan is to avoid
discrimination.
As written, the amendments enable employers to provide early retirement
incentives in the form of flat dollar amounts, service-based benefits or a per-
centage of one's salary to all employees once the workers reach a particular
age.' 3' Similar treatment would be allowable for pension arrangements. The law
also permits an employer to offer a plan that gives employees credit for a
designated number of years, provided they attain a certain age and retire within
a certain time period. 3 2
Recognizing that the remainder of §4(f)(2)(B) is devoted to the "equal benefit,
equal cost" rule, employers must make note of a certain privilege which could
affect how they comply with this provision. The Senate Report stipulates that
employers seeking to satisfy this rule may base necessary cost data on generally
accepted actuarial principles. 33 However, cost data may also be determined by
looking to other reasonably relevant information such as the effect of aging on
disability incidence and costs."'
The ability to integrate certain benefits should be considered a minor victory
for employers. Employers argued during the drafting stages of the OWBPA, that
they possess limited funds to designate for employee benefits."' They claimed
they could not afford to allow a select group of employees to collect both forms
of payment. The new §4(l)(3) enables employers to offset retiree health benefits
and shut down related pension subsidies.' When the detailed requirements for
pension benefits are satisfied, the employer may offset these against the workers'
disability payments.
Another key point about the new language is that it takes into account the
two most common forms of exit incentives-pension subsidies and social security
bridge payments. 3 7 Officials believe two-thirds of employers provide one of these
two opportunities. 3 8 This so-called "safe harbor" for these forms of benefits
gives employers some freedom in structuring these programs. Employers may
continue to set a minimum eligibility age to receive benefits from a pension
131. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
132. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §4(I)(2)(D), 104 Stat. 980
(1990).
133. 136 CONG. REC. S13,597 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (prepared statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
134. See supra notes 88-90.
135. Senate Report at 1559. Fred Rumack, Executive Director of the Association of Private
Pension and Welfare Plans, testifying on the need for integrating benefits, stated, "through this
coordination of severance and pension benefits, employers are able to target limited funds available
for severance benefits to laid-off long-term employees who are unable to tap their pension resources
in order to provide for their needs during unanticipated unemployment." Id. citing Hearings by the
Subcommittee on Labor and the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., (1989).
136. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
138. 136 CONG. REc. S13,603 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (prepared statement of Sen. Pryor).
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plan, 139 for the Act draws an analogy to a similar practice authorized under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.14
Additionally, §4(l)(1)(C) allows employers to provide social security bridge
payments to employees who are eligible."4 However, employers must ensure the
supplemental payments do not exceed a worker's Social Security benefits. Fur-
thermore employers utilizing these programs should know that they are restricted
in attempting to stop payments of these benefits."i 2
The new language in Title II presents greater challenges to employers and
must be dealt with carefully. Waivers and/or releases under the ADEA are
exercised by employers in a variety of different contexts."13 Whether implemented
as a result of an individual's discharge or in the case of voluntary or involuntary
group layoffs, these agreements provide necessary assurances to the employers.'4
Although Title II doesn't eliminate this opportunity for employers, it forces
companies to rethink their approach to this area.
In order to comply with the stringent requirements of the OWBPA, employers
must initially come up with an agreement which both sides can comprehend." 5
For this reason, employers must ensure that the language involved is clear and
simple. Particular attention must be paid to the employee's background and level
of schooling. Employers should also be conscious of the need for translation.
No matter how simply worded a release is, it has no value if the worker is not
completely proficient in English.
With respect to the litany of requirements described in §7(f)(1)146, it is
advisable for employers to devise a system easily suited to verification. Agreements
must be cross-proofed to make sure they address the relevant issues. Employers
should carefully scrutinize the document(s) to check that employees are advised
to seek legal aid when deciding whether to accept a waiver. 47 Dates pertaining
to termination, vesting, etc. should be highlighted and an accurate record of this
information maintained. Additionally, an employer has to be cognizant of all
previous arrangements which an employee claims fall outside the scope of the
139. Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §4(I)(I)(A), 104 Stat. 979(1990).
140. Senate Report at 1559.
141. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
142. See Senate Report at 1527. Enforcement of this provision is administered under Title II of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §401 et seq.).
143. See supra notes 107-124 and accompanying text. The Senate Report provides three different
scenarios in which waivers and releases are utilized. First, where an employee is discharged and
offered something of value in exchange for waiving any and all claims associated with the discharge.
Second, where a company is forced to resort to involuntary lay-offs, they may try to avoid potential
litigation by offering money or benefits in resolution of any claims resulting from the lay-off. Finally,
where companies must reduce their operations, they may try to achieve their goal through the use
of early-out incentive programs. In this case, employers offer a sufficient sum of money to the
employee for retiring early, and the employee agrees not to sue the company for age discrimination.
Senate Report at 1565.
144. Opponents of the OWBPA expressed concern that employees would accept a generous benefit
one day and turn around and sue the next. They saw waivers as a means of stopping disputes short
of litigation. Senate Report at 1564.
145. See supra note I10.
146. See supra notes I 10-1 17 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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agreement.'4 This last recommendation is important since employees may only
waive those rights to which they are not already entitled. 49
Employers contemplating exit incentives for a class of employees face even
more stringent demands under §7(f)(1)(H) of the ADEA.150 In order to satisfy
those additional requirements, prior planning is a necessity. When evaluating the
records of those who qualify for certain programs, employers must realize that
the treatment of one employee will affect the entire group.
Employers are also responsible for keeping track of how long an individual
is eligible for such a program. 5 ' This information should be available and ready
whenever group termination appears imminent. Thus, updating the information
is invaluable and should be undertaken prior to any possible group offerings.
Finally, employers are obligated to keep a current list of job titles of those
participating in any program. 52 This information should be organized according
to department, in order to keep similar job classifications together. To conserve
time, employers should track the ages of employees in the same file. This file
should be kept above and beyond all other personnel benefit records. Arranging
the data in this fashion facilitates organization during group program offerings.
The larger the offering, the more important it becomes, because each affected
employee is entitled to receive all the aforementioned data when they are offered
a waiver.
V. PERHAPS A CHANGE IS IN ORDER
An analysis of the OWBPA would not be complete without offering sugges-
tions on how to improve its effectiveness. While there is little doubt that change
was needed as a result of Betts, the sweeping reform which arose smacks of the
same unfairness it was designed to eliminate. Whether because the amendments
were too hastily written or not considered carefully enough, 3 one can argue that
they impose too great a burden on employers. This is particularly true in the
area of waivers. The potential effect on employers could be disastrous as they
attempt to comply with the costly and rigid requirements necessary for each
waiver they seek to offer. For example, it may be difficult for the employer to
know what is understood by the average individual when the employer attempts
to draft a waiver that complies with the OWBPA. By employing such a standard,
the OWBPA is setting employers up for numerous lawsuits.
Similarly, the term "group" as it is applied to a group exit incentive plan
is also left undefined. This is troublesome for employers because courts may
interpret this word to mean whenever a plan is offered to more than one
individual. If interpreted in this manner, the language will have a considerable
effect on employers due to the measurable difference in the requirements for
148. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
151. Consistent with the theme of this portion of the amendment, employers should be prepared
to provide the employee with this information in writing.
152. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
153. 136 CONG. REC. S13,599 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (prepared statement of Sen. Hatch). See
also Senate Report at 1550.
[Vol. 18:87
All Betts Are Off
waivers to individuals and the requirements for waivers to workers situated in a
class.
A third instance of the ambiguity of the current language may be found by
examining the standard listed for determining whether all employees in a group
exit plan comprehend the terms of a waiver. As it is worded now, if an employee
is able to produce individual workers who did not understand the waiver, then
it is possible that all waivers signed in conjunction with a plan would be in
jeopardy. Clearly this standard is overly harsh for employers. Although some
standard is definitely needed, it must be one that is fair for both sides.
Substantively, one possible alternative to modify the onerous provisions
found in §7(f)(1) would be to rescind §7(f)(1)(H)(ii). While this provision may
have been designed to safeguard against violations against the Act, the earlier
litany of requirements should adequately address that concern. 15 4 Additionally, if
this provision was implemented as a further method of aiding the employee in
deciding about a waiver, a question arises as to whether it achieves this goal.
Will it mean more data which will confuse the employee? Will it impede the
overall goal of reaching an amicable settlement? By eliminating this section, those
issues will never arise. Removing this requirement would also cut down signifi-
cantly on an employer's time in arranging the necessary data for releases. 155
It is arguable that Courts interpreting these provisions will construe them
quite strictly. Should this be true, any defect in the aforementioned process would
render the waiver invalid. For this reason, the OWBPA should be further amended
by reducing or removing the reference to a revocation period under §7(f)(1)(G).5 6
With all the time provided employees to decide whether to accept the waiver and
all the information they receive to help them with this decision, an "escape
hatch" no longer appears to be needed. Allowing this requirement to exist casts
uncertainty into the settlement process. It unfairly affects employers who should
be able to reasonably rely on the terms of the agreement.
One could also argue that with this last grace period, the earlier time
restrictions of the OWBPA5 7 will be superfluous. Employees will be tempted to
rely on this extra safety net, thereby eschewing early and careful scrutiny of the
agreement.
Finally, this provision may tend to cause animosity between employer and
employee. Numerous chances at revocation do little to bridge any gaps which
exist between the parties. In fact, they may bring about distrust that could result
in the employer being less inclined to continue offering such attractive packages.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act emphasizes that an employer
may not, in general, differentiate among his treatment of employees. However,
exceptions such as §4(f)(2) afford the employer some opportunity to be flexible
within the employee benefits realm. While various courts have tended to interpret
154. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
155. The savings attributed to this action could be reflected in the generosity of the benefit
package offered.
156. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 115.
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these exceptions restrictively, the Supreme Court greatly expanded their dimension
in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts. The result gave
employers wide latitude in their approach to benefit plans.
The OWBPA attempts to rectify this imbalance. One of the main purposes
of these amendments is to provide the proper interpretation for §4(0(2) of the
ADEA. However, while the OWBPA provides some needed clarification to the
Act, it generates profound obstacles for employers trying to draft employee
benefit plans and waivers and releases of ADEA claims.
If the current law is allowed to stand, we are likely to see the pendulum
swing in the other direction. Soon it will be the employers who will be considered
the oppressed. Some employers may not even survive.
In order to prevent this from happening the OWBPA must be cleaned up.
Otherwise the amendments which were designed to provide protection, will have
nothing left to protect." s
Mark D. Pomfret*
158. An alternative proposal to S. 54, by Senators Hatch and Jeffords, would have come closer
to the proper balance being urged. Their approach would have preserved an employee's options and
choices while at the same time ensuring that the choices were knowing and voluntary. However, their
modifications would achieve this without restricting an employee's choice, jeopardizing the employee's
chances of receiving benefits, or backing the employee into unnecessary litigation. See also Senate
Report at 1565.
* B.A., Middlebury College, 1987; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1992.
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